The ǫ-logic (which is called ǫE-logic in this paper) of Kuyper and Terwijn is a variant of first order logic with the same syntax, in which the models are equipped with probability measures and in which the ∀x quantifier is interpreted as "there exists a set A of measure ≥ 1 − ǫ such that for each x ∈ A, . . . ." Previously, Kuyper and Terwijn proved that the general satisfiability and validity problems for this logic are, i) for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1), respectively Σ 1 1 -complete and Π 1 1 -hard, and ii) for ǫ = 0, respectively decidable and Σ 0 1 -complete. The adjective "general" here means "uniformly over all languages."
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1 -complete and Π 1 1 -hard, and ii) for ǫ = 0, respectively decidable and Σ 0 1 -complete. The adjective "general" here means "uniformly over all languages. " We extend these results in the scenario of finite models. In particular, we show that the problems of satisfiability by and validity over finite models in ǫE-logic are, i) for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1), respectively Σ 0 1 -and Π 0 1 -complete, and ii) for ǫ = 0, respectively decidable and Π 0 1 -complete. Although partial results toward the countable case are also achieved, the computability of ǫE-logic over countable models still remains largely unsolved. In addition, most of the results, of this paper and of Kuyper and Terwijn, do not apply to individual languages with a finite number of unary predicates. Reducing this requirement continues to be a major point of research.
On the positive side, we derive the decidability of the corresponding problems for monadic relational languages -equality-and function-free languages with finitely many unary and zero other predicates. This result holds for all three of the unrestricted, the countable, and the finite model cases.
Applications in computational learning theory (CLT), weighted graphs, and artificial neural networks (ANN) are discussed in the context of these decidability and undecidability results.
Introduction
In the new age of "big data," machine learning and statistical inference have been increasingly applied in the technology sector, and more resources than ever before are poured into advancing our understanding of these techniques. One approach to this end is to reconcile the inductive nature of machine learning with the deductive discipline of logic. Previous attempts include one by computer scientist Leslie Valiant , the creator of the PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) model of computational learning theory (CLT). In Robust Logics [26] , he tried to combine the PAC model with a fragment of first order logic (FOL) in the context of finite models. The logician H. Jerome Keisler in [7] also investigated a variant of FOL with probabilistic quantifiers of the form (P x ≥ r) meaning "holds for x in a set of measure at least r."
Most recently, Terwijn and Kuyper [22] [11] invented a probability logic with a fixed error parameter, called ǫ-logic (or, in this paper, ǫE-logic), that is inspired by features of both Valiant and Keisler's work. This ǫE-logic uses the same syntax as FOL and differ only in that 1) the models are given probability measures, and 2) the ∀ quantifier has the interpretation of "holds for x in a set of measure at least 1 − ǫ." In particular, the ∃ quantifier keeps the same, non-probabilistic interpretation as in first order logic.
Such an unusual, asymmetric definition was motivated by the key property of ǫE-logic to be learnable through examples, in a sense related to Valiant's PAC-learning model [11, Thm. 2.3.3] : roughly, for any desired error bound ǫ and an example oracle that emits elements of the universe M according to a distribution D, we can learn in time polynomial in 1 ǫ whether (M, D) |= ǫ φ or (M, D) |= ǫ ¬φ. Thus, ǫE-logic has an inductive property, in addition to promises of deductive properties that would seem to carry over from classical first order logic.
However, it turns out that deductive reasoning in ǫE-logic is computationally much harder than first order logic in the general case. In fact its complexity does not even reside in the arithmetic hierarchy, but rather the analytic one. As a result, there is no algorithm to decide (uniformly over all first order languages) whether a given sentence is valid or satisfiable. The following table summarizes the current knowledge on the satisfiability and validity 1 problems of ǫE-logic (defined below in (2.1.6) and (2.1.5)). Each tuple n 1 , n 2 , . . . represents that the corresponding result requires the language to have at least n 1 unary predicates, at least n 2 binary predicates, and so on. In particular, the value of ω means an infinite number of the corresponding type of predicate is necessary. The empty tuple means that any language suffices. Finally * denotes that the set of ǫE-valid sentences coincides with the set of valid sentences in first order logic, so any language that admits a decision algorithm in FOL will do so in ǫE-logic as well. As general FOL validity is Σ 0 1 -complete, this means that general ǫE-validity is also Σ Table 1 : Current knowledge on general ǫE-satisfiability and ǫE-validity [10, Table 1] It is still open, however, whether a smaller fragment of ǫE-logic -for example, languages with a finite number of unary predicates, or languages with a single binary predicate -admits an easier complexity.
Notice that the results are not symmetrical as in the case of first order logic, where φ is valid iff ¬φ is not satisfiable. Indeed, ǫE-logic is paraconsistent [11, Prop. 2.2.1], because it's possible for (M, D) |= ǫ ∀xφ(x) and (M, D) |= ǫ ∃x¬φ(x) to hold at the same time (for example if the set of x satisfying ¬φ has measure 0 but is not empty).
In this paper, we answer the counterpart questions for ǫE-satisfiability by and validity over finite models and in some cases, countable models (see (2.3.5) for definitions). As noted above, we cannot in general answer the satisfiability question by just answering the validity question, nor vice versa.
In first order logic, Trachtenbrot's theorem [15] asserts that, perhaps counterintuitively, assessing the validity of a theorem over only finite models is Π 0 1 -hard. Therefore we do not even have a deductive calculus for this task.
We show that other than the case of ǫ = 0, Trachtenbrot's theorem holds also for ǫE-logic. More precisely, we will establish the following characterizations.
Here, the tuple notation n 1 , n 2 , . . . denotes language requirements, as in the last table, but * means that the set of ǫE-valid sentences over finite models coincides with the corresponding set over finite models with regard to FOL.
Like in the unrestricted case, it is still open whether the conditions on signature can be significantly weakened.
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q ǫ = 0 finite ǫE-satisfiability Σ 0 1 -complete ω, 3 (3.4.9) decidable (3.1.3) finite ǫE-validity Π 0 1 -complete ω, 1 (3.5.9) Π 0 1 -complete * (3.5.9) Hence, other than the case of finite 0E-satisfiability, the ǫE-satisfiability and ǫE-validity problems in the finite model scenario are as hard as the corresponding problems in ordinary first order logic [15, p. 166] . Therefore, no general deduction mechanism exists for theorems over finite models.
In contrast, for ǫ ∈ [0, 1) rational, we show that these problems are decidable over monadic relational languages, which are languages with only unary predicates and no function symbols or equality. This mirrors the characterizations for the corresponding FOL fragments.
Despite these successes, the countable case remains largely unsolved. While models of ǫE-logic have a downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem transforming them into equivalent continuum-sized models [11, Thm. 5.1.5] , this theorem does not hold when "continuum-sized" is replaced with "countable." So unlike FOL, the set of sentences ǫE-valid over all countable models does not coincide a priori with the set of those over all models.
In the format of the previous tables, we summarize the current knowledge on countable ǫE-validity and satisfiability in table (3) .
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q ǫ = 0 countable ǫE-satisfiability unknown decidable (3.1.3) countable ǫE-validity Σ The outline of the paper is thus: After introducing some notations and prerequisites, we review the basic definitions of ǫE-logic, ǫ-model, the validity and satisfiability problems, and other related notions in section (2) . We then define in section (2.2) the dual logic, ǫF-logic, in whose terms we phrase many of our results. Briefly, in ǫF-logic, the syntax is once again identical to that of FOL, but the quantifier ∃x is interpreted to mean "there exists a set A of measure > ǫ such that for each x ∈ A, . . . ." Having laid out the analogue concepts over finite models, we dive straight into examples and applications in section (2.4), hoping to motivate our main theorems and future research.
There, we employ ǫE-logic and ǫF-logic to
• model the approximation concept existence assumption of PAC learning;
• develop rudimental theories of graphs with weighted vertices and graphs with weighted edges; and
• compute the linear threshold update rule in artificial neural networks.
With these examples in mind, we begin our deductions. In section (3.1), we prove the decidability of 0E-satisfiability over both finite models and countable models. In section (3.2), we show that the satisfiability and validity of sentences in any monadic relational language both reduce to linear programming, and thus are decidable whenever ǫ ∈ Q. During the development of the reduction, we introduce trees as semantic tools. These ideas are extended in section (3.3) to define the semantics of q-sentences, which generalize both ǫE-and ǫF-logics by allowing all forms of quantifiers. This new form of sentences allows us to rigorously state the inter-reduction results of Kuyper and Terwijn between different rational ǫ parameters. Equipped aptly with powerful machinery, in section (3.4) we tackle the Σ 0 1 -completeness of the ǫE-satisfiability problem over finite models. The hardness proof involves a painstaking encoding of the halting set in a suitable language. The definability proof utilizes a perturbation lemma that simplifies satisfiability to that by models with rationallyvalued distributions. Last but not least, we show in section (3.5) that 0E-validity coincides with FOL validity when both are restricted to finite or countable models. (Of course, in the countable case, the "countably FOL valid" sentences are just the unrestricted valid sentences by Lowenheim-Skolem). With Kuyper's inter-reduction theorem, we deduce that ǫE-validity for finite models is Π 0 1 -complete and that for countable models is Σ 0 1 -hard for any strong enough language. Finally, we wrap up and mention possible future directions of research in section (4).
Notation and Prerequisites
Sets of the form {1, 2, . . . , n} will be abbreviated n .
Logic
Script upper case letters M and N are used to denote first order models. Their underlying universes are written M and N . All first order languages are assumed to have an at most countable signature.
x denotes a finite sequence of variables or parameters. | x| denotes the length of this sequence. φ( x, y) will always represent a formula with free variables x 1 , . . . , x n and y 1 , . . . , y m , possibly with other bound variables. In the context of a first order model M,
represents a formula with free variables x, y and parameters p i ∈ M . ∀ x is the shorthand for the quantifier block ∀x 1 ∀x 2 · · · ∀x n . Similarly, ∃ x is the shorthand for the quantifier block ∃x 1 ∃x 2 · · · ∃x n .
If φ is a (formal or informal) sentence, then φ ∈ {0, 1} denotes its truth value. In formulas, we adopt the convention that ∧ is parsed before ∨ when written without parentheses. For example,
Formulas of the form
In addition, we will use square brackets [] in place of parentheses () when doing so improves the readability.
A subset A ⊆ N is called Σ Please refer to Soare [21] for unexplained concepts in computability.
Measure Theory
Let X be a set. P(X) denotes the power set of X. By a measure µ on X, we mean a set function µ : A → [0, ∞] that is defined and countably additive on some σ-algebra A ⊆ P(X). The triple (X, A, µ) is called a measure space. Similarly, by a finitely additive measure µ on X, we mean a set function µ : A → [0, ∞] defined on some Boolean algebra A ⊆ P(X), and µ is finitely additive on A. In both cases, the σ-algebra or Boolean algebra A on which µ is defined is denoted dom µ. We say that µ is everywhere defined if dom µ = P(X). We say that a measure µ on X is extended by
The µ-measure of a set of elements satisfying some condition φ is denoted µ(x : φ(x)).
When we say "A has measure at least 1/2," we implicitly assume A is first of all measurable, and then that it has measure at least 1/2. Primarily we will be discussing probability measures, i.e. measures µ on X with µ(X) = 1. We use upper case script letters starting from D, E, etc to name them. In the contexts of probability measures, we will also use the probability notation Pr x∈D [φ(x)] interchangeably with D(x : φ(x)).
Please refer to Bogachev [4] for unexplained concepts in measure theory.
Linear Programming
A linear program is a triple L = ( x, E, f ) where
• E is a set of |E| = n (weak) linear inequalities
and
• f is a linear function, called the object function,
In general, if assignment x = a satisfies all inequalities e i , then we write
Here C is the matrix {c p j x j = r can be written as two weak inequalities, we can allow E to contain equations as well.
To maximize L is to find max(L) := max
Likewise, to minimize L is to find min(L) := min
L is said to be feasible if
In this paper, we are mainly concerned with the feasibility problem of linear programs. As such, we conveniently identify each program L with its set of inequalities E.
In the arithmetic model of computation, the arithmetic operations of addition, multiplication, subtraction, division, and comparison are assumed to take unit time. It is known that maximizing, minimizing, and finding the feasibility of a linear program is polynomial time in the arithmetic model [17] . Because all such arithmetic operations on rational numbers are decidable, Proposition 1.1.1. The feasibility problem of linear programs with rational coefficients is decidable.
We will also briefly cross path with strict linear programs. These are linear programs L = ( x, E, f ) where E consists of strict inequalities or equalities but with no weak inequalities.
Please refer to Schrijver [19] for unexplained concepts with regard to linear programming.
Here we formalize the ideas touched in the introduction. First, we revisit the definitions of ǫE-logic, ǫE-model, and related ideas as defined by Terwijn and Kuyper. Then, we introduce ǫF-logic, the dual logic of ǫE-logic. Finally, an abundance of examples and applications are provided to clarify these ideas.
E-logic

Let
• L be a first order language, possibly containing equality, of a countable signature;
• ǫ ∈ [0, 1];
• M be a first-order model with universe M ;
• D be a probability measure on M defined on some σ-algebra dom D ⊆ P(M ).
Definition 2.1.1 (ǫE-truth).
2 Let φ( x; p) = φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ; p 1 , . . . , p n ) represent a formula with variables x and parameters p i ∈ M. We define the notion of ǫE-truth, denoted (M, D) |= ǫ φ, inductively as follows:
1. For every atomic formula φ( x; p):
That is, for all tuples (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ M, φ( a; p) holds.
2. We treat the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ classically. For example, for x, y, z distinct sequences of variables,
3. The existential quantifier is treated classically:
4. The universal quantifier is interpreted probabilistically:
Note that the universal quantifier in this definition binds a single variable x; in general it's not true that (M, D) |= ǫ ∀ xφ( x, y; p) ⇐⇒ Pr
5. The case of negation is split in subcases as below:
(b) ¬ distributes classically over ∧ and ∨, e.g.
(e) (M, D) |= ǫ ¬∀xφ(x, y; p) ⇐⇒ (M, D) |= ǫ ∃x¬φ(x, y; p).
6. The implication symbol → reduces to boolean combinations classically:
7. The equivalence symbol ↔ reduces to the conjunction of two implications:
This logic system is called ǫE-logic. When referring to the set of all such logics for ǫ ∈ [0, 1] or when ǫ is a fixed parameter implicit in the context, we simply use the term E-logic.
To make sure that the ∀ quantifier makes sense, we need to impose measurability conditions on definable sets. In this paper, classical models refer to the models used in ordinary first-order logic. They are distinct from the concept defined here: Definition 2.1.2. Let L be a first order language of a countable signature, possibly containing equality, and let ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Then an ǫE-model for the language L consists of a classical first-order L-model M together with a probability measure D over M such that:
1. For all formulas φ = φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and all a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ∈ M, the set
2. All relations of arity n are D n -measurable (including equality, if it is in L), and all functions of arity n are measurable as functions from (M n , D n ) to (M, D). In particular, constants are D-measurable.
A probability model is a pair (M, D) that is an ǫE-model for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 2.1.3. Two ǫE-models (M, D) and (N , E) are ǫ-elementarily equivalent, denoted by
Definition 2.1.4. Two formulas φ and ψ are ǫ-equivalent, denoted by
φ and ψ are called (semantically) equivalent, written
Definition 2.1.5. Let φ be a first order sentence. We say that φ is ǫE-valid if for all ǫE-models
Similarly we define Definition 2.1.6. A sentence φ is said to be ǫE-satisfiable if there exists an ǫE-model
To distinguish between these concepts and the analogue concepts over finite and countable ǫE-models, we also prefix these terms with unrestricted or postfix them with in the unrestricted case. For example, ǫE-valid means the same thing as unrestricted ǫE-valid, or as ǫE-valid in the unrestricted case.
Likewise, to make the distinction clear from the corresponding notions in FOL, we say Definition 2.1.7. A formula φ is classically valid if every first order model satisfies φ. A formula φ is classically satisfiable if some first order model satisfies φ.
We could define normally ǫE-satisfiability in analogy to normally ǫE-validity, but this concept would be equivalent to ǫE-satisfiability [10, Thm 2.6, Prop. 2.7] .
Finally, we record the following proposition which will often be implicitly applied.
Proposition 2.1.8 (Terwijn [22] ). Every formula φ is semantically equivalent to a formula φ ′ in prenex normal form.
The Dual Logic, F-logic
Definition 2.2.1. Let L be a countable first order language, possibly containing equality. Let Φ = Φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a first order formula in the language L, and let
We call the logic under ⊢ ǫ ǫF-logic.
Suppose for quantifiers ▽ 1 , ▽ 2 , . . . , ▽ n ∈ {∀, ∃} and a quantifier free formula ψ, for all x n , ψ(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) holds.
With this remark, it's easy to see that ǫF-logic is the dual logic of ǫE-logic, in that the quantifier ∀ is interpreted classically, while the quantifier ∃ is interpreted as "with measure strictly greater than ǫ."
More formally and in parallel with the inductive definition given for E-logic, we can write 1. For every atomic formula φ( x; p):
3. The universal quantifier is treated classically:
4. The existential quantifier is interpreted probabilistically:
Note that the existential quantifier in this definition binds a single variable x; in general it's not true that
We can similarly define ǫF-models for F-logic by replacing condition 1 of definition (2.1.2) with
• For all formulas φ = φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and all a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ∈ M, the set
However, note that
. . , a n )} and thus, (M, D) is an ǫE-model iff it's also an ǫF-model. Henceforward we will uniformly adopt the term ǫ-model for this use case. Similarly, it should be clear from definitions (2.1.3) and (2.1.
ǫF-validity and ǫF-satisfiability (along with their synonyms) are defined similar to definitions (2.1.5) and (2.1.6). Due to duality, we have that Proposition 2.2.2. φ is ǫF-valid iff ¬φ is ǫE-satisfiable. In general, φ is ǫX-iff ¬φ is not ǫY-′ , where (X, Y) is a permutation of {E, F}, and ( , ′ ) is a permutation of {valid, satisfiable}. 
Kuyper has shown well-formed model-theoretic properties exist for E-logic (and by duality, Flogic). For example, a downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem always allows one to work on a model of continuum size [11, Thm. 5.1.5], and a variant of ultrapower construction works for a weakened definition of ǫ-models [11, Cor. 5.4.10] . But they are futile in the finite setting for the same reason that their classical counterparts do not work in classical finite model theory.
Despite this difficulty, finite and countable ǫ-models are still very conducive to analysis because from them we automatically get (finite and countable) probability models.
Proof. By induction on formula complexity, we show (M,
All cases other than ∀ are trivial, as they don't involve measures.
For φ( x; p) = ∀yψ(y, x; p), we have
where the middle equivalence derives from the fact that D ′ agrees with D on dom D.
Lemma 2.3.3 (Tarski [3] ). Every finitely additive measure D on a set X can be extended to a finitely additive measure D ′ so that dom D ′ = P(X).
The above two lemmas allow us to "complete" ǫ-models in the following sense:
is a probability model and by (2.3.2),
Proof. The case of finite ǫ-models (M, D) follows directly from the lemma since D is countably additive iff D is finitely additive. For the case of countable models (M, D), notice that D cannot be atomless, or else M would have to be uncountable. Suppose a 0 ⊆ M is an atom. If M − a 0 is not null, then the restriction of D on M − a 0 by the same reasoning must not be atomless, and so there is an atom a 1 ⊆ M − a 0 . By induction, M can be expressed as the disjoint union of at most countable number of atoms and a null set. Hence it suffices to show that (by assuming M is an atom itself) D extends to P(M ) when D is a 0-1 measure.
Suppose not. Then every measure defined on all of P(M ) is inconsistent with D. In particular, the measure I x concentrating measure 1 on an element x ∈ M cannot be a extension of D, and that can happen only if there is T x ∈ D with measure 0 but contains x. Thus there is a countable set
Because every finite or countable ǫ-model (M, D) can be taken to have D everywhere defined on P(M ), we treat D as a point function on M . It then makes sense to speak of D(a) for a ∈ M and in particular, elements of measure zero, or null elements.
Finally, we define the main objects of study in this paper.
Definition 2.3.5. For X = F or E:
A sentence φ is said to be finitely ǫX-valid and is called a finite ǫX-validity (resp. countably ǫX-valid and countable ǫX-validity) if φ is ǫX-satisfied by all finite (resp. countable) ǫ-models.
Likewise, a sentence φ is said to be finitely ǫX-satisfiable and is called a finite ǫX-satisfiable (resp. countably ǫX-satisfiable and countable ǫX-satisfiable) if φ is ǫX-satisfied by some finite (resp. countable) ǫ-models.
In addition, to distinguish between these concepts and the similar concepts in FOL, we say that a formula φ is finitely classically valid if φ is satisfied by all finite first order models; a formula φ is finitely classically satisfiable if φ is satisfied by some finite first order model.
Note that by the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, what would be the concept of "countably classically valid" coincides with unrestricted validity in first order logic. This is not true for ǫE-or ǫF-logic unconditionally. Terwijn and Kuyper provide a counterexample in [13, exmp 4.5].
Examples and Applications
Here the goal is two-fold: 1) we clarify concepts developed in the previous sections through examples, and 2) we also note possible applications of ǫE-and ǫF-logic, in part to motivate the main theorems. For the second point, we feel it is illuminating to mention results in later sections. Readers are encouraged to check that these anachronism are correctly applied after perusing their respective expositions.
We first exhibit some examples that highlight the difference in semantics between classical first order logic and our ǫE-and ǫF-logics. Example 2.4.5. Let ψ(x) be a formula with a single free variable. In first order logic,
are equivalent formulas.
In ǫE-logic, for any parameter a ∈ M ,
In first order logic, a common way to assess whether a theorem ψ follows from a set of axioms T is to pass the sentence τ := ¬(T → ψ) to some resolution algorithm R. T implies ψ iff R resolves τ to a contradiction.
But the obvious analogue for ǫE-logic cannot work:
because of the paraconsistency of ǫE-logic. However, from definition (2.
Rephrasing using ǫF-logic then,
Thus, axioms T , interpreted inside ǫF-logic, (metalogically) imply theorem ψ, interpreted inside ǫE-logic, iff T → ψ is an ǫE-validity. By results (3.4.2) and (3.5.6) of Kuyper and Terwijn that we record in later sections, we can even interpret each quantifier in T (resp. in ψ) in αF-logics (resp. αE-logics) for different αs, in this sense:
Let T be in prenex normal form ▽ 1 x 1 · · · ▽ n x n φ( x). For every ▽ i = ∃, we translate ▽ i x i as "there exists a set A i with measure > α i such that for each x i ∈ A i , . . . ;" The quantifier ∀ is interpreted as usual. Each α i can be any arbitrary rational number in [0, 1] , independent of what other α j s are. Similarly, let ψ be in prenex normal form
For every ▽ i = ∀, we translate ▽ i x i as "there exists a set B i with measure ≥ 1 − β i such that for each x i ∈ B i , . . . ." The quantifier ∃ is interpreted as usual. Each β i can be any arbitrary rational number in [0, 1] , independent of what other β j s are. The implication T =⇒ ψ (resp. ψ =⇒ T ) under these translations can be expressed as some sentence in ǫE-logic (resp. ǫF-logic).
(∇)
As a corollary, if T is a conjunction of sentences {Λ j } l j=1 and ψ is a disjunction of sentences
of rational numbers in [0, 1], there is some sentence Φ such that the following are equivalent:
• Φ is finitely ǫE-valid.
Though such a form of deduction theorem may not seem useful at first, it nevertheless allows the expression of statements regarding many types of mathematical objects, including concept classes in CLT, graphs with weighted vertices, graphs with weighted edges, and artificial neural networks.
In what follows, we give examples of such expressions and their meanings in both ǫE-logic and ǫF-logic. For ease of reading, we will write ∀ ≥1−ǫ for ∀ in the context of ǫE-logic and ∃ >ǫ for ∃ in the context of ǫF-logic. As noted, in a single sentence, the ǫ parameter may vary, so it is meaningful to write
Each boolean symbol whose meaning has not been defined is a shorthand for the usual composition of symbols ¬, ∧, ∨.
These examples will hopefully give a rough picture of the implications of our decidability and undecidability results.
Example 2.4.7 (PAC learning). Define the following:
• an example space is a probability space (X, D) with probability distribution D;
• a concept class C is a collection {U ⊆ X} of subsets of X, identified with their indicator functions;
• for U ∈ C, an example oracle EX(X, D, U ) is a device that randomly returns a pair (x ∈ X, U (x)) for every invocation. The pair is sampled according to D.
In the basic PAC learning model [25] , we are given X, C, and an example oracle EX that emits elements of X according to an unknown distribution D and unknown concept U ∈ C. We wish to efficiently find a concept close enough to U , in the following sense:
We have a probabilistic algorithm that, for all error parameters ǫ and δ, for all distributions D on X, in time polynomial in
Typically, X is taken to be B s = {0, 1} s for some s, and C is a subclass of the boolean functions on B n .
It is important to note that this learning model assumes for the given EX, some approximation concept U ′ exists in C.
In particular, this happens if EX labels elements according to some concept in C. But in practice this may not always be the case 3 . In ǫE-logic with a language having monadic predicate P 1 , . . . , P s and c, we can express this assumption.
In what follows, for a general vector w, w i will represent the ith value of w; M is a first order model over universe B s , and
D is a probability measure everywhere defined over M .
(Point class)
. The point concept class over B s is the collection
In other words, each concept labels exactly one point of B s as 1 and the rest as 0. Assumption (℘) holds for the point class iff
(Of course it is much more convenient to use equality, but we refrain in order to take advantage of the decidability of monadic relational languages)
(Parity class). For each
where (−) · (−) mod 2 is the dot product in the vector space (Z 2 ) s .
The parity concept class over B s is the collection
Then assumption (℘) holds for the parity class iff Assumption (℘) holds for the conjunction class iff
Here we code each conjunction concept C w using 2 bitstrings x and y: if
(1-Decision lists)
. Let Z be a triple (α, β, b) where α, β ∈ B s and b ∈ {0, 1}. A 1-decision list DL Z represented by Z is the decision procedure that, on input v ∈ B s , runs as follows
ψ i represents a computation of DL (x,y,b) (for any b) on input w that proceeds to the ith if statement before returning.
φ represents a computation of DL (x,y,z1) on input w that proceeds to the else statement.
Then assumption (℘) holds for the 1-decision lists iff
VC dimension is an important quantity of concept classes studied in CLT. We will not define it here (consult [6] ) but wish to mention to the computational learning theorists that, as these examples illustrate, when a concept class C over B s has VC dimension f (s), assumption (℘) can be expressed over (M, D) by a formula with O(f (s)) number of quantifiers (exercise!).
On the other hand, in ǫF-logic, we can express certain interesting conditions on the probability space (M, D).
1. "more than half the time, the label is 1":
2. "the probability that the ith bit is 1 is strictly between ǫ and 1 − ǫ":
As a straightforward generalization, the quantifier-free part of the expression can be swapped out for a more complicated boolean combination.
3. "most bits are irrelevant to the concept -the label only depends on 2 fixed bits":
This is the setting for attribute efficient learning [9] .
As noted before, each ǫ in these examples can vary over the rationals at will. Imagine we want to find if uniform i δ1 and uniform j δ2 along with atteff 2 would imply (℘) for some concept class C. We may do so by querying for the ǫE-validity of a two-part sentence T → φ derived from applying note (∇).
By the decidability of monadic relational languages (3.2.8 and 3.2.11) established later, these kinds of questions are all decidable, as long as all statements use only unary predicates.
It is also possible to add a BIT relation to ǫE-and ǫF-logics along the lines of the corresponding relation in classical finite model theory [15] . One can then express concept classes over all size parameter s with one single sentence. However, the complexity of deduction then becomes unknown. Example 2.4.8 (graphs with weighted vertices). Let L be a language with a single binary relation E(·, ·), standing for the edge relation between two vertices. As in first order logic, any ǫ-model of this language is automatically a directed graph with at most one edge between every pair of vertices (including loops). Moreover, in such ǫ-models, to each vertex of the graph structure is assigned a weight in [0, 1] such that the total sum of all vertex weights is 1; however, the edges are not weighted. Such graphs with weighted vertices can be used to model, among many things, cities with populations and in general the PageRank algorithm.
Because in ǫF-logic, ∀ is interpreted classically, we can express quite a few properties of graphs:
1. loopless: ∀x¬E(x, x).
undirected:
3. complete:
4. bipartite with a fixed partition (if L has a unary predicate A):
Similarly, k-coloring can be expressed as well.
5. in a simple graph, "every 1-neighborhood collectively has weight more than ǫ" (if L has equality):
6. "every directed triangle has collective measure more than ǫ" (if L has equality):
7. "every element has a unique successor of positive measure" (when L has equality):
8. "there exists a set of 'initial' vertices A collectively with weight more than ǫ such that every v ∈ A is connected to every vertex in the entire graph":
On the other hand, in ǫE-logic, we can express the likes of the following.
1. "there is a clique of size k":
In general, for any fixed graph G, we can express the existence of a subgraph isomorphic to G.
2. "there is a subgraph isomorphic to G that carries weight ≥ 1 − ǫ":
where iso G is a formula expressing x is isomorphic to G.
3. in a simple graph, "there is a single vertex v that is connected to at least 1 − ǫ (by weight) of other vertices":
In ǫE-logic, we can also make weakened version of universal statements from the ǫF-examples by replacing ∀ with ∀
The transformed sentences will then quantify over all elements of positive measure, rather than all elements. For instance, the sentences given for the loopless, undirected, complete, and bipartite properties all carry over to apply to the subgraph consisting of all nonnull vertices.
This weakened quantifier suffices in most cases. In fact, later on, our proof of the undecidability of finite ǫE-satisfiability (3.4.4) depends heavily on this competency of ∀
≥1
.
In some cases, when ǫ > 0, the quantifier ∃ >ǫ can also be replaced (per note (∇)) with ∀ ≥ǫ without affecting the intended semantics very much. For instance, the property "every 1-neighborhood collectively has weight more than ǫ" differs very little from "every 1-neighborhood collectively has weight more than ǫ" in most imaginable applications.
Example 2.4.9 (graphs with weighted edges). Instead of assigning a measure to vertices, often we want to assign numbers to edges of a graph, for example in a MAX-FLOW or a path-finding problem.
Let L be a language with binary relations I(·, ·), C(·, ·), and D(·, ·). Here I(x, y) represents that the codomain of edge x equals the domain of edge y; D(x, y) (resp. C(x, y)) represent that edges x and y have the same domain (resp. codomain). Thus, any graph with weighted edges {e i } i∈M such that the total weight equals 1 is automatically a probability model in L.
Conversely, suppose (M, D) has an everywhere defined measure D and classically satisfies the axioms of
• "C and D are equivalence relations":
along with the analogues for D.
• "incidence relation respects domain and codomain":
(IDC)
• "domain and codomain respect incidence relation":
• "domain and codomain are unique":
Let V D and V C be respectively the equivalence classes modulo D M and C M . For every element a, denote its equivalence class in V D by a D and that in V C by a C . By axiom (DCI), By the same reasoning, we also derive the codomain function cod : M → V, a → a C . These data then uniquely determine a graph with edges M and vertices V .
As ǫF-logic interprets ∀ classically, it can convey the axioms along with many of the usual properties of graphs.
loopless:
∀x¬I(x, x).
2. "no more than one edge per pair of vertices" (if L has equality):
3. bidirectional: "each edge x has a corresponding edge with positive weight that goes in the opposite direction":
On the other hand, we cannot express undirectedness without changing the axioms. The reader is encouraged to work out the axioms for a simple graph with weighted edges.
4. complete: "for any two edges x and y, there is an edge with positive weight that connects x to y":
5. "every directed triangle has collective weight > ǫ" (if L has equality):
For any fixed k, we can also make the analogous statement for k-cycles.
6. "every length k path from x to y has weight > ǫ" (if L has equality):
For any fixed graph G of size k, the constructions in this and the last items generalize to make statements of the form "any subgraph isomorphic to G has total weight > ǫ."
As with example (2.4.9), in ǫE-logic, for any fixed graph G, we can express the existence of a subgraph isomorphic to G. We can also assert that some such subgraph has weight ≥ 1 − ǫ. These properties may be desirable when working with MAX-FLOW problems. We introduce new predicates actv t (x) that represents whether the presynaptic neuron of edge x is activated at time t. It satisfies the following relations for each t.
1. "Suppose x and y have the same presynaptic neuron. Then actv t (x) holds iff actv t (y) holds":
2. the linear threshold update rule:
In a typical usage of ANN, there are two sets of distinguished neurons I and O called input neurons and output neurons. At the beginning, each neuron of I is activated or deactivated according to an input bitstring, for example derived from a digital image. All other neurons are not activated. After some time t, the activation states of the neurons of O are returned as a bitstring. Continuing our example, we might desire the output of 1 from every output neuron iff the image is of a butterfly.
Imagine we are interested in whether some property Φ of ANN implies some property Ψ. If we can phrase Φ as a sentence to be interpreted under ǫF-logic and Ψ as a sentence to be interpreted under ǫE-logic, then we can answer this question by querying for the ǫE-validity of
where Λ is the conjunction of the axioms of the graph from example (2.4.9) and the axioms of actv t from this example.
Unlike the example of PAC learning, we cannot say with certainty whether any or all of the theories of finite graphs with weighted vertices, finite graphs with weighted edges, or finite artificial neural networks are decidable. The main theorems of this paper will establish that the naive method is out of the picture: there is no general deduction mechanism for ǫE-or ǫF-logics when restricted to finite ǫ-models. In particular, this result holds even when restricted to first order languages with a finite number of binary relations and an infinite number of unary predicates. But that is not enough to determine the exact computability of the above theories, each of which uses only a finite number of unary predicates. (Even for ANN, in almost all use cases, only a finite number of actv t predicates are considered). Weakening the language requirement remains a major research area in ǫE-and ǫF-logics.
Related to the issue of decidability is expressability. We note in passing that despite these examples, ǫE-and ǫF-logics still have nontrivial limitations in expression power. These limitations derive in many cases from the limitations of first order logic itself. A detailed discussion of impossibility results in expressability is outside the scope of this paper, but we mention that quite a few techniques for first order logic, like locality, carry over to our probability logics. The interested reader is advised to consult [15] .
Validities and Satisfiabilities
Finite and Countable 0E-Satisfiabilities
In contrast to first order logic, where Trachtenbrot's theorem implies that an effective calculus for deducing true theorems over finite models cannot exist, we show here that finite and countable 0F-validities are decidable. Moreover, the results of this subsection apply to any first order language. Consequently, finite and countable 0E-satisfiability are also decidable regardless of language.
(Recall that x is a shorthand for a sequence of variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n for some n ≥ 0, and ∀ x is a shorthand for ∀x 1 ∀x 2 · · · ∀x n ).
Lemma 3.1.1 (validity conversion). Let ▽ i ∈ {∀, ∃} represent quantifiers, and
where ψ is a quantifier free formula. Suppose I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} is an enumeration of all indices i such that
where each y denote a block y, y, . . . , y of y repeated some number of times, depending on the location of y. In other words, in φ * , all x j with j ∈ I has been substituted with the free variable y.
Then φ is finitely 0F-valid iff φ ′ is finitely classically valid. φ is countably 0F-valid iff φ ′ is classically valid.
Proof. Let's consider the finite validity claim of the theorem. The countable validity portion is almost exactly the same.
(φ finitely 0F-valid =⇒ φ ′ finitely classically valid ) Let V k be a classical model of size k, with universe {1, 2, . . . , k}. Define measures E i,k on it such that E i,k (i) = 1 and E i,k (j) = 0, ∀j = i. If (V k , E i,k ) ⊢ 0 φ, then all the x j , j ∈ I (i.e. all those with an existential quantifier) must be interpreted as i since i has measure 1.
Now vary k, and we conclude that φ ′ is classically finitely valid. Note that the above reasoning did not use finiteness in an essential way. In fact, slightly modifying the argument shows that φ 0F-valid for all 0-models of size κ implies φ ′ classically valid for all first order models of size κ.
(φ ′ finitely classically valid =⇒ φ finitely 0F-valid ) Let (M, D) be a 0-model with the universe M = {1, . . . , k}. By proposition (2.3.4), we can take D to be defined on all subsets of M . Since φ ′ is satisfied by all classical models, M |= φ ′ =⇒ M |= ∀yφ * (y). Because M is finite (this is the only place where the finiteness is used; substitute countability for the countable case), there must be an element a ∈ M with positive measure. Then M |= φ * (a), meaning that all the ∃ bindings (with the interpretation under ⊢ ǫ of measure strictly positive) in φ are realized by a. Thus (M, D) ⊢ 0 φ. Since (M, D) is an arbitrary finite 0-model, φ is finitely 0F-valid.
be a universal formula, where ψ is quantifier free.
The following are equivalent:
1. φ is finitely classically valid.
2. φ is classically valid.
Proof. Certainly, (2) =⇒ (1). It suffices to show (1) =⇒ (2).
Because for any first order model M, M |= φ( y) ⇐⇒ M |= ∀ yφ( y), we assume that φ is a sentence ∀ xψ( x). Let n = | x|.
Suppose φ is satisfied by all finite (classical) models but there is an infinite model M |= ¬φ. Then there is a tuple a ∈ M n such that M |= ¬ψ( a). We form a finite model
such that M ′ |= ¬ψ( a), which would yield a contradiction.
c is a constant symbol that appears in φ}. Given F i , set
f is a function symbol that appears in φ}
Then we define the universe of our model to be
where k is maximal number of times any function symbol appears in ψ, and r is an arbitrary new element. F 0 is obviously finite, and given F i is finite, |F i+1 | ≤ |F i | · |length(φ)| is finite. Thus each F i is finite and so M ′ is finite. The relations in M ′ will be the relations of M restricted to M ′ . For each function symbol f in the language, define
if f appears in ψ, and otherwise arbitrary. Finally, for each constant symbol c, the interpretation is
It's easy to check that if t is a term that appears in ψ, then t M = t M ′ , and if R is an n-ary relation that appears in ψ then
Thus by induction M ′ as constructed satisfies ¬ψ( a) as desired.
But universal classical validities reduce to propositional tautologies: for each prime formula π with n arguments, and each n-tuple x of variables in the language, form a propositional variable p π, x . Then a universal formula ∀ yψ( y, z) with ψ quantifier-free is valid iff ψ prop , the propositional formula where all instances of prime formulas π( x) are replaced by the propositional variable p π, x , is a propositional tautology. Since propositional validity is decidable, this combined with (3.1.2) yields Theorem 3.1.3. For any first order language, the set of finitely 0F-valid formulas coincides with the set of countably 0F-valid formulas. They are both decidable. Therefore, the set of finitely 0E-satisfiable sentences coincides with the set of countably 0E-satisfiable sentences, and they are both decidable.
Monadic Relational Language
Let L be a first order language
• with no equality,
• with no function symbols,
• with no relation of arity at least 2, and
• with at most a finite number of unary predicates P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P s .
We call L a monadic relational language. In this subsection, we show that for any such language, unrestricted, countable, and finite ǫE-satisfiabilites and ǫF-satisfiabilities are all decidable, ergo the computability of ǫE-validities as well.
The essence of the proofs in this section resides in the fact that each ǫ-model in such a language "has only a finite amount of information": They are partitioned by the monadic predicates into a finite number of indistinguishable parts, and the measures of these parts uniquely determine the models up to ǫ-elementary equivalence. This observation allows us to reduce these satisfiability problems to linear programming. Lemma 3.2.1. Let L be monadic relational with unary predicates P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P s . Suppose (M, D) is an ǫ-model in L. Then there is a finite probability model (N , E) such that (M, D) ≡ ǫ (N , E).
Furthermore, we can take the universe to be some subset N ⊆ P( s ) and require that for every a, b ∈ N , if P N l (a) holds when and only when P N l (b) holds, then a = b. Proof. For each U ⊆ s , define the subset
s disjoint parts. It should be immediate that for any formula φ(x), any U ⊆ s , and a, b
Now we define (N , E). Let N := {U : M U = ∅} and let E be defined on points U by
Then U∈N E(U ) = 1, so E is a probability measure. Finally, define the interpretations P For any quantifier-free formula φ( x, y) with j = | x| and k = | y|, every U ∈ N k , and every sequence of quantifiers ▽ 1 , . . . , ▽ j ∈ {∃, ∀},
iff for all (and, by (∆), for any)
We proceed by induction on the number j of quantifiers. The case of j = 0 is immediate by our construction.
Suppose that our claim is proved for j = j ′ ≥ 0. The case of ψ( U ) :
does not involve measures and is obvious. For ψ( U ) :
By induction hypothesis,
The converse direction follows by reversing this line of reasoning and applying (∆). The claim starting from "Furthermore" follows by our construction.
We introduce the concept of ǫE-and ǫF-trees to help us analyze satisfiability of sentences.
Definition 3.2.2. Let M be a set. A tree in M with height n is defined as a tree T with n levels (from 1 to n) with the following properties 1. all nodes are subsets of M .
2. if node V is at level k < n, then V has a child V ≻x for each x ∈ V , and these are all of V 's children.
3. if node V is at level n, then V has no children; V is called a leaf node of T .
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The unique root of T is denoted root T . A bran of a tree in M with height n is defined as a sequence (a i , V i ) n i=1 of pairs, where for each i, 1. V i ⊆ M is a node of T at level i, 2. a i ∈ V i , and
We will also write a i ∈ V i n i=1 for a bran, which should not cause any confusion.
. . , ▽ n be a sequence of quantifiers from {∃, ∀}. Let (M, D) be an ǫ-model. An ǫE-tree in (M, D) with levels Q is defined as a tree in M with height n such that:
1. if ▽ k = ∃, then all nodes at level k are nonempty subsets of M ; level k is called a ∃-level.
2. if ▽ k = ∀, then all nodes at level k are D-measurable subsets of M with D-measure at least 1 − ǫ; level k is called a ∀-level.
where φ is quantifier-free. An ǫE-tree in (M, D) for Φ is defined as an ǫE-tree in (M, D) with levels ▽ 1 , . . . , ▽ n with the additional property that
When Φ (or Q) and (M, D) are clear from the context, we will simply use the term ǫE-tree. 2. if ▽ k = ∀, then all nodes at level k are M ; level k is called a ∀-level.
where φ is quantifier-free. An ǫF-tree in (M, D) for Φ is defined as an ǫF-tree in (M, D) with levels ▽ 1 , . . . , ▽ n with the additional property that (S) for every bran a i ∈ V i n i=1 , M |= φ( a).
When Φ and (M, D) are clear from the context, we will simply use the term ǫF-tree. is not a 
is a 1 4 F-tree for Φ, but not a 1 2 F-tree. As an exercise, the reader should verify that there is no 3 4 F-tree for Φ in our choice of (M, D). Note once again that, as this example illustates, nodes across the same level in an ǫF-tree need not be distinct.
It should be apparent from the definitions and examples that Therefore, Φ is (unrestricted/finitely/countably) ǫE-satisfiable iff there exists an ǫE-tree in some (unrestricted/finite/countable) (M, D) for Φ. This statement holds also when F substitutes E. Now we are ready to tackle the decidability of monadic relational languages. Theorem 3.2.8. Let L be a monadic relational first order language and ǫ ∈ [0, 1] be a rational number. Then ǫE-satisfiability in L is decidable for the unrestricted, the countable, and the finite cases.
Proof. By lemma (3.2.1), all three ǫE-satisfiability follow from the finite case, so we will prove the latter. In particular, it suffices to consider only satisfaction by probability models (M, D) with universe M ⊆ P( s ), with D everywhere defined, and with the property that
Call such models simple models.
Let Φ be a sentence in L, without loss of generality in prenex normal form
where φ( x) is quantifier-free and each ▽ i is a quantifier. By proposition (3.2.7), Φ is ǫE-satisfiable by simple models iff there is an ǫE-tree in some simple (M, D) for Φ. But all such trees are trees in some subset of P( s ) with height n, which are finite in number. Thus, we only need to devise an algorithm that, for anyṀ ⊆ P( s ) and any tree T iṅ M with height n, tests whether there exists simple model (M, D) with universeṀ such that T is an ǫE-tree in (M, D) for Φ -and it suffices to verify definition (3.2.3). ButṀ is the universe of some such simple model (M, D) iffṀ is so with the interpretations
Thus, assuming this structure of M, we can check conditions (1) and (S) of definition (3.2.3) immediately, in finite time.
Finally, for any surviving T and M with universeṀ , we find whether there exists a probability measure D everywhere defined such that T satisfies condition (2) . (M, D) fulfills this condition iff for every node V ⊆Ṁ at a ∀-level in T ,
This is equivalent, then, to the feasibility of the linear program LP with variables µ a for every a ∈Ṁ and inequalities
2. µ a ≥ 0, for each a ∈Ṁ , and 3. a∈Ṁ µ a = 1. Evidently, because ǫ is rational, all coefficients in LP are rational. By proposition (1.1.1), LP is solvable in finite time.
Thus condition (2) can be verified effectively.
The corresponding result for ǫF-logic will proceed similarly, except that the linear program will involve strict inequalities. The following result of Carver is needed to prove the next lemma.
Proposition 3.2.9 (Carver [19] ). Let A be a matrix and let b be a column vector. There exists a vector x with Ax < b iff y = 0 is the only solution for Now we are ready to characterize the monadic relational fragment of ǫF-logic. The method of proof follows roughly the same path as for theorem (3.2.8).
Theorem 3.2.11. Let L be a monadic relational first order language and ǫ ∈ [0, 1) be a rational number. Then ǫF-satisfiability in L is decidable for the unrestricted, the countable, and the finite cases.
Proof. Let Φ be a sentence in prenex normal form.
Again, by lemma (3.2.1), it suffices to consider only the finite case and only satisfaction by probability models (M, D) with universe M ⊆ P( s ), with D everywhere defined, and with the property that
Just as in the proof of theorem (3.2.8), it's enough to check in finite time, for eachṀ ⊆ P( s ) and each tree T inṀ , whether there is a simple (M, D) with universeṀ such that T is an ǫF-tree
• M ′ is the set of nonnull elements ofṀ ,
• D ′ is the restriction of D to M ′ , and
• T ′ is derived from T by restricting every node V ⊆Ṁ of T to M ′ .
Therefore we may consider only D that is everywhere positive. Again, we can assume M to have interpretations
for each U ∈Ṁ and l ∈ s . So conditions (2) and (S) of definition (3.2.5) can be easily verified. Finally, for any surviving T and M with universeṀ , we find whether there exists a probability measure D everywhere defined such that T satisfies condition (1). Thus T is an ǫF-tree in (M, D) iff for every node V ⊆Ṁ at an ∃-level in T ,
The existence of such D is equivalent to the feasibility of the strict linear program LP with variables µ a for every a ∈Ṁ and inequalities
2. µ a > 0, for each a ∈Ṁ , and 3. a∈Ṁ µ a = 1. By lemma (3.2.10), this is decidable.
By duality, we can phrase theorems (3.2.8) and (3.2.11) thus Corollary 3.2.12. Let L be any monadic relational first order language and ǫ ∈ (0, 1) be a rational number. Then for X = E or F, (unrestricted/countable/finite) ǫX-satisifiability and validity are both decidable.
q-Sentence, q-Trees, and q-Satisfiability
Here we generalize the various concepts of ǫE and ǫF like trees and satisfiability. These generalizations will allow us to express computability reduction results in the next section.
Definition 3.3.1. For any first order language L, a q-sentence in L is defined as a string of the form
where φ is a quantifier-free L-formula in n variables, and for each i,
Quantifiers of the form Q If q-sentence Φ has no strong q-quantifiers and no ∀, then Φ is called a qE-sentence. In the same way, if Φ has no weak q-quantifiers and no ∃, then Φ is called a qF-sentence. Definition 3.3.2. Let Φ := ▽ 1 x 1 · · · ▽ n x n φ( x) be a first order logic sentence, with ▽ i ∈ {∃, ∀} and φ quantifier-free. The ǫE-coercion of Φ is defined as the q-sentence
where
Likewise, the ǫF-coercion of Φ is defined as the q-sentence
For an arbitrary first order sentence Φ, its ǫE-coercion is the coercion of the equivalent prenex normal form. Similarly for ǫF-coercion.
Clearly, both coercion functions are computable. In addition, every q-sentence in the image of ǫE-coerce is a qE-sentence, and every q-sentence in the image of ǫF-coerce is a qF-sentence. Definition 3.3.3. Let Q = ▽ 1 , ▽ 2 , . . . , ▽ n be a sequence of quantifiers from QSET. Let M be a first order model and D be a probability measure on its universe M . An q-tree in (M, D) with levels Q is defined as a tree in M with height n such that: . Thus T can be an ǫE-tree with levels Q but not necessarily be a q-tree with levels Q, as ∀ is interpreted differently.
It is also a q-tree for Φ if Φ = ∃xQ
is a q-tree with levels Q for Q = ∀, ∃ and Q
Clearly, q-trees are generalizations of both ǫE-trees and ǫF-trees: An ǫE-tree in (M, D) for Φ is exactly a q-tree in (M, D) for ǫE-coerce(Φ). Likewise for ǫF-trees. For every leaf node V in T and every element a ∈ V , set a copy of T ′ as the subtree under a.
and T ′ be the singleton tree {1}. Then T ∧ T ′ is the q-tree
be a pair of first order model and probability measure. Suppose T and T ′ are q-trees in (M, D) respectively for Φ and Φ ′ . Then T ∧ T ′ is a q-tree in (M, D) for the q-sentence
Proof. We verify definition (3.3.3). Conditions (1), (2), (3), and (4) follow easily from the respective conditions on T and T ′ . Each bran of T ∧ T ′ is a concatenation
by T and T ′ 's property (S). So condition (S) holds for T ∧ T ′ as well.
This proposition immediately yields 
Definition 3.3.9. A pair (M, D) of first order model M and probability measure D on M is said to q-satisfy a q-sentence Φ :
if there exists a q-tree in (M, D) for Φ. A q-sentence Φ is said to be q-satisfiable if some (M, D) q-satisfies Φ.
Again, q-satisfiability is just a generalization of ǫE-and ǫF-satisfibiliy: for a first order sentence
The obvious analogue holds for ǫF-satisfiability as well.
Finite ǫE-satisfiability
In this subsection we will show that ǫE-satisfiability is Σ 0 1 -complete for rational ǫ strictly between 0 and 1. The main reason that we would like to work with rational ǫ is the following set of tools provided by Kuyper and Terwijn:
Lemma 3.4.1 (Kuyper-Terwijn inter-reduction [13] [10]). Let
• L be a countable first-order language not containing function symbols or equality,
• L
′ be the language obtained by adding an infinite number of unary predicates to L, and
• ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 be rational such that
More generally 4 , this reduction works "per quantifier": For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q, there exists a computable function F ǫ mapping qE-sentences in L to L ′ -sentences such that the following are equivalent:
Even though the theorem only applies to full satisfiability, the proof works exactly the same for finite (and countable) satisfiability, because the only model construction in the proof is the duplication of a given satisfying model a finite number of times, which preserves finiteness (and countability). Thus Lemma 3.4.2. Let L and L ′ be defined as above. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q, there exists a computable function F ǫ mapping qE-sentences in L to L ′ -sentences such that the following are equivalent:
1. there exists a pair (M, D) with M finite such that
In particular, we are interested in the following case
Let L and L ′ be defined as above and fix rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1). There is a computable function f ǫ such that, for any finite set of rationals J ⊆ Q ∩ [0, 1] and L-sentences {Ψ α } α∈J , the following are equivalent:
1. there exists a pair (M, D) such that, for each α ∈ J, (M, D) is a finite α-model and
By repeated applications of proposition (3.3.8), (M, D) simultaneously q-satisfies all ǫE-coerce(Ψ α ) iff (M, D) |= q Γ for some q-sentence Γ. Now apply lemma (3.4.2).
Therefore, we could compute the simultaneous E-satisfiability over different error parameters α ∈ [0, 1] by using only one fixed ǫ ∈ (0, 1). This property of ǫ ∈ (0, 1) turns out to be powerful enough to allow the encoding of the halting set by sentences in ǫE-logic. It also distinguishes the case of ǫ ∈ (0, 1) from the case of ǫ = 0, for which lemma (3.4.3) is not applicable: whereas the E-satisfiability of the latter is decidable by theorem (3.1.3) , that of the former, as will be shown next, is Σ 0 1 -complete. We now commence the first half of the completeness proof. Proof. The main idea of the proof, as remarked above, is that we want to reduce the halting problem to finite ǫE-satisfiability. Specifically we will show that there is a reduction from the set of Turing machines that halt on empty input (which is Σ • Q is the set of states,
• ∇ is the tape alphabet,
• q 0 is the initial state,
• Q a and Q r are respectively the sets of accepting and rejecting states, and
Since we are only interested in Turing machines with empty input, ∇ can be assumed WLOG to be {0, 1} with 0 representing the blank symbol.
In what follows, we break into three sections the proof for encoding the halting of M as a finite 1 2 E-satisfiability problem. Section 1 describes the first order language used. Section 2 constructs the sentence Ψ which is finitely 1 2 E-satisfiability iff M halts. Finally section 3 proves that Ψ indeed has such a property.
Part 1 (The vocabulary). We define vocabulary
(The constants min, max in σ can be replaced by unary predicates, so the theorem as stated will still stand.)
The intuition behind this vocabulary, which will be formalized by the axioms below, is as follows:
• Elements satisfying N will be "roughly" a set of positive measure, linearly ordered (by <) elements that will be our measure of time and space, such that min and max are the minimal and the maximal elements of this chain -"Roughly", because using ǫE-logic, we cannot specify that elements of measure 0 do not satisfy N (in fact, we cannot say anything about elements of measure 0). A nontrivial part of this proof is used to maneuver around these "phantom elements".
• is a binary relation mimicking equality. We avoid using true equality so that we can use the computable reductions of theorem (3.4.3).
• T (p, t), where p, t ∈ N , represents that at time t, there is a 1 at position p on the tape.
• H(p, t), where p, t ∈ N , represents that at time t, the head of the machine is at position p.
• S q (t), where t ∈ N , represents that at time t, the state of the machine is q.
• R is an auxiliary relation that is used to force certain measures to be equal. Its purpose will become more clear over the course of the proof.
Part 2 (The encoding sentence). In this section we define the sentence Ψ that encodes whether M will halt. Ψ will be of the form
where Thus Ψ is finitely ǫ 0 E-satisfiable iff each T α is finitely αE-satisfiable.
For a formula φ in prenex normal form, we recursively define φ N (called φ relativized to N ):
(T 0 ). T 0 will consist of the conjunction of the following sentences (because ∀x here should be interpreted as "for almost all x", or, as we only deal with finite models here, as "for all x with positive measure," we will write ∀ + for the sake of clarity):
1. All axioms of equality:
is an equivalence relation:
(b) the indiscernability of identicals: for each atomic formula π,
< is a linear order on all elements of N with nonzero measure:
. min and max are respectively minimal and maximal in <:
Initially, M is in state q 0 , the head is in the first position, and the tape has all zeros:
For any time t, M is in a unique state:
. A set of sentences encoding the transition function δ.
First we define a binary relation ≻. The expression t ′ ≻ t is a shorthand for the conjunction of
• "for all s, s is less than t ′ iff s is at most t"
• "for all s, s is greater than t iff s is at least t ′ "
Thus t ′ ≻ t says that "t ′ is a successor or t."
For any formula φ(t, x), let φ(t + 1, x) be defined as the shorthand for the following relativized implication
Hence φ(t + 1, x) states that "φ holds for the successor of t":
Similarly, let φ(t − 1, x) be defined as the shorthand for
The expression φ(t − 1, x) asserts that "φ holds for the predecessor of t."
These shorthands are well-defined when applied to multiple variables. For example, φ(p−1, t+ 1) is the shorthand for
where in the middle → means "expands into."
Now we turn to the task of encoding the transition function.
Suppose the transition function has rule δ(q, w) = (q ′ , w ′ , S) for some q ∈ Q; w, w ′ ∈ ∇; S ∈ {L, R}. For each q and w, we define the sentence
N where cond and trans are constructed as follows.
(a) cond(p, t) checks that "the machine M at time t has state q, has its head pointing at cell p, and the character under the head is w": explicitly, cond(p, t) is the conjunction of the following:
i. "The state of M is q at time t"
ii. "The head of M is above cell p"
iii. "The character at cell p is w" (exactly one of the following sentences belongs to the conjunction, depending on which condition is satisfied)
(b) trans(p, t) asserts that "M at time t + 1 has state q ′ and has moved S from cell p; the cell at p now contains the symbol w ′ ": explicitly, trans(p, t) is the conjunction of the following (in every set of alternatives, exactly one of the sentences belongs to the conjunction, depending on which condition is satisfied):
i. "The state of M is q ′ at time t + 1"
ii. "At time t + 1: If S = R, the head of M is at cell p + 1. If S = L and p = min, the head of M is at cell min. Otherwise, the head of M is at cell p − 1."
iii. "At time t + 1, cell p contains symbol w ′ "
iv. "All cells other than those involved in (6(b)ii) are unaffected".
We assert that at time max, M arrives at an accepting or rejecting state:
8. For reasons that will become clear later, for all x, y of positive measure, we need to let R(x, y) hold only when y is not in N :
This finishes the description of the sentence T 0 . (
is the following conjunction of sentences (because the ∀x here should be interpreted as "for a set of x with measure at least for the sake of clarity):
1. the set of elements in N takes up measure exactly
2. we want each element of N to have measure equal to the total measure of all greater elements. This is where the padding relation R is used.
First, for φ(x) a formula of a single free variable x, we define the following shorthand
The RHS says "for a set X of measure at least 1/2, X ⊆ N and every element of X satisfies φ." If we assume that (1) is
) is equivalent to "all elements in N of positive measure must satisfy φ."
Secondly, for formula ψ(y, x), we define the following shorthand
The conjuncts on the right respectively assert that "the probability of y satisfying ψ(y, x) is at least 1/2" and "the probability of y ′ not satisfying ψ(y ′ , x) is at least 1/2." Hence Pr y [ψ(y, x)] = 1/2 says that "the probability of y satisfying ψ(y, x) is exactly 1/2.
Finally, we define the actual sentences in the conjunction of T 1 2 : (Recall that ∧ has precedence over ∨ for parsing)
If clause (8) of T 0 is 0E-satisfied ("If R(x, y) holds then y has measure 0 or is not in N "), then the disjuncts R(x, y) and N (y) ∧ x < y are disjoint. Therefore, the above two sentences together express "for all x in N that's not max and not null, the measure of the strict final segment of x is the same as the probability of x itself; they are both ( This concludes the construction of the reducing sentence Ψ.
Part 3 (The reduction). Now we show that M halts if and only if Ψ has a finite E-satisfying model.
(M halts =⇒ Ψ satisfiable). Suppose M halts in time m. We define the finite satisfying model (W, D) thus:
• Let the universe W be the set {1, 2, . . . , 2m}.
• Let W be true equality =.
• Let N W be {1, 2, . . . , m}
• Let a < W b for a, b ∈ W be defined to agree with the natural ordering on W .
• Let min W = 1 and max W = m.
• Define the measure
• Define H W (i, j) iff j > m and M 's head is at position i at time j − m.
• Define T W (i, j) iff j > m and the tape's symbol at position i at time j − m is 1.
•
Since all elements of W have positive measure, all ∀ quantifiers in T 0 are interpreted classically. Therefore one can easily check that (W, D) 0E-satisfies T 0 .
As min = 1 has measure For a fixed i < m, the measure of {j :
, and the measure
Letting i vary, we can conclude that "for all x in N W 0 , either x is max W or the probability of y such that R(x, y) ∨ N (y) ∧ x < y holds is exactly 1/2." In other words, the following clause in T 1 Then we have
, and
. In general, if the n-fold successor n W of min W has probability 2 −n−2 for all n < m, then the m-fold successor m W of min W exists, and a) is either max W , or b) satisfy the following equations
which, along with Indeed, we can construct the computation history of M as follows:
-the tape has a 1 at position p iff T (p, t) holds,
-the head of M is above cell p iff H(p, t) holds, and -the state of M is q iff S q (t) holds. Now, aided by the verbal translation provided in the description of T 0 , we can verify that
• Initially, M is in state q 0 , the head is in the first position, and the tape has all 0s (clauses (4) of T 0 ).
• At any time, M is in one state and one state only (clause (5) of T 0 ).
• The tape and M 's head position and state are updated correctly according to δ (clauses (6) of T 0 ). In particular, all cells not specified by the update rule have the same symbol after the update (clauses (6(b)iv)).
• At time max W , M is in either an accepting or rejecting state (clause (7) of T 0 ).
Hence, the 1 2 E-satisfaction of Ψ implies M halts.
Finally, to complete our proof that finite ǫE-satisfiability is Σ 0 1 -complete, we prove Theorem 3.4.6. For both X = E and X = F, finite ǫX-satisfiability is Σ 0 1 -definable for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and any first order language.
Before the proof, we will need the following perturbation results, which allow us to "shake up" the probability measures of each ǫ-model into a nicer form. Since all entries of R and q are rational, by Gaussian elimination, we can reduce the associated matrix R|q to row echelon form R ′ |q ′ with all rational entries. It's then clear that we can perturb each value of p by less than δ/|M | to get p ′ such that 1) each entry of p ′ is positive and rational, and 2) R ′ p ′ = q ′ and thus Rp ′ = q and all positive rational values of D are unaffected. Extending the point measure p ′ linearly to a measure over all subsets of M gives the desired result. 
For the following proof, we do not actually need D ′ (x) to be positive, but this lemma provides an alternative justification for the assumption in the proof of (3.2.11).
Proof of thm (3.4.6). Let t i i≥1 be an effective enumeration of all finite sequences of ω (for example by Gödel's β function). For each finite sequence t i let |t i | denote the length of the sequence, let t i j denote the jth element of t i , for 1 ≤ j ≤ |t i |, and let t i denote the sum of its elements
Let σ be the vocabulary used in φ. To test whether a sentence φ is ǫE-satisfiable by a finite model, we inspect t i in sequence for i = 1, 2, . . . . For each t i we form all classical models with signature σ on |t i | elements {1, 2, . . . , |t i |}. There are only a finite number of them since σ is finite. We turn these classical models into ǫ-models by imbuing them with the measure D defined by D(j) = t i j / t i . We can then mechanically check whether any of them satisfy φ.
If (M, D) |= ǫ φ for some finite ǫ-model (M, D), then WLOG we can assume M = {1, 2, . . . , m} for some m, D to be defined on all subsets of M (by proposition (2.3.4)), and D to have all rational values (by lemma (3.4.8)). Thus there exists an integer r such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, D(i) = r i /r and r i is an integer. Our algorithm described above will then terminate before k + 1 outer loops, where
. This shows that the ǫE-satisfiability problem for rational ǫ is Σ 
Finite and Countable ǫE-validity
Like the unrestricted case, the set of finitely (resp. countably) 0E-valid sentences also coincides with the set of finitely (resp. countably) classically valid sentences. With Kuyper's inter-reduction result for ǫE-validities and the Σ 0 1 -definability derived from the last section, we can characterize ǫE-validity over finite models precisely as Π 0 1 -complete whenever ǫ ∈ Q.
Theorem 3.5.1. For any countable first order language, the set of finitely 0E-valid sentences is exactly the set of finitely classically valid sentences. The set of countably 0E-valid sentences is exactly the set of classically valid sentences.
Proof. Obviously every finitely classically valid sentence is a finitely 0E-valid sentence. Now suppose φ is finitely 0E-valid. Then for any n, (M, D) |= 0 φ for all classical models M of size n and D the uniform distribution. But in such 0-models, ∀ has the same interpretation as classically. Hence all finite classical models satisfy φ, as desired.
The proof works the same for countable validities, except that for countably infinite models, we instead ascribe the exponential distribution D(n) = • The set of finitely (resp. unrestricted) classically valid sentences in S is decidable.
• The set of finitely (resp. countably) 0E-valid sentences in S is decidable.
In any first order language with at least one binary relation, the set of finitely classically valid sentences is Π 0 1 -complete [15, p. 166] . Therefore, Corollary 3.5.3. In any first order language with at least one binary relation, the problem of determining whether a sentence is finitely 0E-valid is Π 0 1 -complete.
Likewise, as classical validity in any language with at least one binary relation is Σ 0 1 -complete [24] , we have in the countable case Corollary 3.5.4. In any first order language with at least one binary relation, the problem of determining whether a sentence is countably 0E-valid is Σ There exist computable reductions for ǫE-validity just like in the case of ǫE-satisfiability (see proposition (3.4.1)): Proposition 3.5.5 (Kuyper inter-reduction [12] ). Let
• L be a countable first-order language not containing function symbols or equality, and
• L
′ be the language obtained by adding an infinite number of unary predicates to L.
Along the same lines, for the countable case, we have Corollary 3.5.10. For any language with an infinite number of unary predicates and at least one binary predicate, countable ǫE-validity is Σ 0 1 -hard for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, we mention a theorem of Terwijn.
Proposition 3.5.11 (Terwijn [23] ). Let φ be a sentence. φ is finitely classically valid iff φ is countably ǫE-valid for every ǫ > 0.
4 Future Work
The Countable Case
As displayed by table (3), we still do not know much about ǫE-logic over countable ǫ-models. Most egregiously we have no idea of the computability of its satisfiability problem. Looking over the entries of tables (1), (2), and (3), the pattern seems to favor the possibility of countable ǫE-satisfiabilty being Π 0 1 -hard or even complete. Obviously our proof for the finite case would not carry over, but it is conceivable that replacing the halting set with a Π 0 1 -complete set would work out naturally. Alternatively, we could look at the dual problem of reducing the halting set to countable ǫF-validity.
Reducing Language Requirement
In our results, the requirements of an infinite number of unary predicates and at least three binary predicates are likely not optimal. In classical first order logic, these requirements can be collapsed to the single requirement of one binary predicate through graph theoretic or set theoretic encodings. However, in ǫE-and ǫF-logic, these methods do not seem to play well with the additional structure of a probability space. In any case, for our theorems to be more relevant to applications, the number of unary predicates must be brought down to a finite number, whether strengthening our undecidability or breaking into decidability.
q-Logic and Trees
We developed q-sentences and other q-concepts only to arrive at results for ǫE-and ǫF-logic, but they can as well be studied on their own. In particular, an obvious definition of q-logic would make it a stronger version of Keisler's probability logic which only allows the quantifiers Q ≥ ǫ and Q > ǫ . Keisler's work [7] can then be applied in most aspects to such a q-logic.
Similarly, one could investigate the algebraic structure of ǫE-, ǫF-, and q-trees, whose properties we have not fully exploited. It should not be hard to see that, for a fixed ǫ-model (M, D) and a fixed (q-)sentence Φ, there is a natural partial order and a join operation on trees (M, D) for Φ of each class. Instinctively one could ask, under what circumstance does a meet operation exists? Deeper research into the semilattice structure of these trees could reveal information on the computability of ǫE and ǫF fragments not discussed here.
Irrational ǫ
There are several insufficiencies in current techniques with regard to deducing facts about irrational ǫs:
(i) Terwijn and Kuyper's proofs of the inter-reduction theorems fundamentally require the ratio ǫ 0 /ǫ 1 to be rational. So while this would imply we have inter-reductions between, say , we cannot say much about the relative difficulties of . Surpassing the obstacles to generalize to irrational ǫ would necessitate brand new methods, which could also eliminate the infinite unary predicate restriction.
(ii) Our proof of the Σ 0 1 -hardness of finite ǫE-satisfiability depends crucially on the ability of 1 2 Elogic to force the measures of two sets to be equal. Without a reduction from 1 2 E-to ǫE-validity, we cannot conclude that ǫE-validity is Σ 0 1 -hard.
(iii) In order for a linear program to be solved in finite time, all arithmetic operations over the field generated by its coefficients must be total computable. This holds for the rational and general number fields, but not for the field of computable reals, for which the comparison function is not total. Thus our proof of decidabilities in monadic relational languages do not carry over to the general case.
Fortunately, as our example section illustrate, in many cases only the relative magnitude of ǫ matters. This observation also boosts the likelihood that our computability results hold for general ǫ as well.
Classical Model Theory Techniques
Given the applications in section (2.4) and the initial motivation of ǫE-logic, we see that it has an intimate connection with computational learning theory. At the intersection of CLT and classical model theory is the concept of VC dimension [6] [14] [1] [2], which we mentioned briefly. It could be possible to reconcile the results of these two disciplines in ǫE-and ǫF-logics, to the benefit of all involved.
As our examples also hinted, many techniques in finite model theory could be converted to versions for our probability logics. One could also experiment with adding new means of expressions like the BIT relation, a canonical ordering, counting operators, etc. An analogue of descriptive complexity could be developed; given the abundance of probabilistic quantifiers in classes like BPP, PP, PCP, and so on, it is indeed plausible that one could equate one of these complexity classes with a description class in ǫE-logic.
A version of Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games [15] , another common tool in finite model theory, for ǫE-logic could also have connections to the malicious advisary learning model [8] [20].
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